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Abstract

The assumption of rationality is both one of the most important and most controversial assumptions of modern economics. This article discusses what current
experimental economic as well as neuroscience research tells us about the relationship between rationality and the mechanisms of human decision-making. The
article explores the meaning of rationality, with a discussion of the distinction
between traditional constructivist rationality and more ecological concepts of rationality. The article argues that ecological notions of rationality more accurately
describe both human neural mechanisms as well as a wider variety of human behavior than do constructivist notions of rationality.
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NEUROECONOMICS AND RATIONALITY
TERRENCE CHORVAT* & KEVIN MCCABE**
The assumption of rationality is both one of the most important and
most controversial assumptions of modern economics. This article
discusses what current experimental economic as well as neuroscience
research tells us about the relationship between rationality and the
mechanisms of human decision-making. The article explores the meaning
of rationality, with a discussion of the distinction between traditional
constructivist rationality and more ecological concepts of rationality. The
article argues that ecological notions of rationality more accurately
describe both human neural mechanisms as well as a wider variety of
human behavior than do constructivist notions of rationality.
INTRODUCTION
A greater understanding of human thought processes can aid us the
study of law in at least two ways. First, it can help us to better predict what
will be the effect of a particular legal regime on behavior, which is of
primary importance in deciding on the proper structure of a legal regime.
Second, it can also help us to understand what it means improve the
welfare of the members of society. Just as all human decision-making
involves making estimates concerning optimality, so it must be for the
government and its decision-making, and neuroscience can and should
inform these decisions.
In recent years, we have learned a great deal about human decision
making. Not only has there been an enormous amount of behavioral
research but there has also been a large and increasing amount of research
on the neural mechanisms involved in human decision-making. It is
difficult to overstate the importance of this research to our understanding of
human decision-making. Although Milton Friedman once suggested that,
as we formulate models, the truth of the assumptions does not matter if the
* Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University. Prof. Chorvat would like to thank the
Laurence Cranberg Foundation and the Law and Economics Center for its support.
** Professor of Economics and Law, George Mason University, Director, the Center for Law and
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model can predict behavior reasonably correctly,1 butas Herbert Simon
pointed out that would only be this is a good way of thinking if we don’t
have microscopes.2 Effectively, we do now have microscopes which we
can use to examine the mechanisms of human decision making.
I.

HUMAN DECISION-MAKING AND RATIONALITY

One of the key problems for both economics and for the application of
economics to legal scholarship is the extent and the nature of rationality
exhibited by economic actors. This is one of the largest areas of
disagreement between adherents of traditional law and economics and the
proponents of what is often referred to as behavioral law and economics,3
This article discusses what some of the most recent research in
experimental economics, as well as research in neurology and the relatively
new discipline of neuroeconomics, can tell us about rationality and the
importance of rationality for legal scholarship.
The notion of rationality creates many problems for economics and
legal scholarship. First, it is not immediately obvious what it means to be
rational.4 A reasonable definition would be a decision process that results
in the selection of the “best” method of accomplishing a goal.
Alternatively, almost any decision process which is rule-based can be
argued to be rational.5 In addition, rationality can be applied to many
aspects of decision-making. For example, rationality can be applied to
belief, which forms a key part of choice behavior. If a decision maker
ignores some pertinent evidence in forming the relevant beliefs, then one
might term these beliefs irrational. On the other hand, one could argue that
an action could be rational given the beliefs of the individual, although the
model building process is faulty.
The notion of rational belief is important to understanding of legal
issues in part because reasoning about social problems generally must be
highly opportunistic. We rarely have direct answers to those questions
which we would most like to be answered. We can only imperfectly
understand human behavior and the range of potential responses to
1. MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS(1953).
2. Herbert Simon, Discussion: Problems of Methodology 53 AM. ECON. REV. 229, 230 (1962)
3. Colin Camerer, and George Lowenstein Behvaioral Economics: Past , Present and Future in
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (2003), 3-4.
4. One might view rationality to include the selection of the optimal neural mechanism, which is
discussed infra at section II.c
5. Such a process can be said to maximize conformity with the rules on which it is based. GARY
S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976).
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particular legal regimes. Therefore, we can only make probabilistic
predictions about that behavior which will result under differing
combinations of legal rules.6 At best, we can claim that the process by
which those predictions are made may be more or less rational.
Another inherent problem that rationality poses for legal scholarship is
how should we address the fact that the degree of rationality found in the
population is heterogeneous? Should we treat all individuals as equally
rational? If most but not all individuals are rational generally rational, what
does this mean in terms of what presumptions policymakers and judges
should make? No agent, either individual or institutional, possesses all the
relevant information for making decisions.7 Therefore, decisions must be
made in the absence of perfect information. To what extent should we treat
such agents as rational if the level of information varies, and consequently
the decision-making processes vary?
Modeling Rationality
Those models relevant to law will generally have as their inputs
environmental variables, and have as their outputs the behavior of
individuals, groups of individuals, or institutions. Therefore, one might
argue that research into neurobiology and neuroeconomics will only give
us information that in some sense we could have learned from
psychological or standard economic research. This argument, however,
reflects a faulty understanding of the model-creating process. It is very
likely that by understanding the neural mechanisms of decision-making we
will be able to create better models of the interaction between the
environment and human behavior. Proceeding without the insights of
neurobiology and neuroeconomics would be rather like attempting to
model the behavior of a car without understanding the intricacies of the
internal combustion engine. As an understanding the oxygen requirements
of the combustion process will serve to explain why cars do not perform as
well at high altitude, or on cold days, research in neurobiology and
neuroeconomics will help us resolve many conflicts over the nature of
human behavior, such as the extent to which, as well as the ways in which,
6. A good example of this is the development of the hub and spoke system as a result of the
deregulation of airlines in the 1970s, because the airport operators did not charge as higher fee for
increased airport congestion. See Vernon Smith, Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in
Economics: Nobel Prize Lecture 2002, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 465 (2003).
7. We do not know if the sun will explode tomorrow, or if the earth’s magnetic field will
dissipate more quickly than anticipated. Both of these events would have a dramatic effect on our future
plans.
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humans are rational (which might change from individual to individual as
well as society to society).
One can argue that law and economics is in fact a form of applied
psychology in that it seeks to apply a particular model of human behavior
i.e., choiceto solve problems. The methodology of law and economics has
been able to help us to answer a number of important questions because it
is able to from precise models that create falsifiable predictions. The results
from testing earlier predictions are then used to alter the models to cause
them to come into greater conformity with observed behavior, both by
revealing the likely result of particular policy prescriptions and also by
modifying our understanding of what an optimal society might be. Here,
the new relatively new discipline of hedonic psychology can play an
important role.8
While the premises behind its normative conclusions can of course be
questioned, it is difficult to question the usefulness of economic analysis in
the discussion of any number of diverse issues such as optimal tax policy,
the drug legalization debate, “three strikes” laws, or any form of economic
regulation such as anti-trust and securities laws. It is difficult to argue that
there is no correlation between behavior and well-being. Some of the utility
of economic analysis derives from the fact that for many purposes, it does
appear that for many purposes individuals can be considered rational.9
Recall that rationality can be defined as selecting the best method of
accomplishing a specified goal. Clearly, from an evolutionary perspective,
pleasure and pain exist to motivate human behavior but, as research in
cognitive neuroscience has shown, these are not the only systems which
influence behavior and therefore it should not be surprising to us that some
behavior appears irrational.10 One of the hallmarks of rational decisionmaking is the notion that preferences, whatever they may be, are stable.11 If
choices are random, it may difficult to refer to these choices as guided by
preferences.12

8. See generally WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1999).
9. Alvin Roth, Adaptive Behaviour and Strategic Rationality: Evidence from the Laboratory and
the Field in THE RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR (Kenneth Aroow et al. eds,
1996)
10. Bartley G. Hoebel, Neural Systems for Reinforcement and Inhibition of Behvaior: relevance to
Eatring, Addiction and Depression in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (
Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999), 558.
11. ADREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY (1995).
12. See Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory , 70 J. Pol. Econ. 1 (1962).
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A common defense of the rationality assumption has been that a wide
variety of behavior can be explained by models based on this assumption.
However, many academic commentators have discussed how predictions of
the standard economic model do not seem to be borne out in either
experiments with individuals or in the econometric data.13 A number of
academics have argued that, in fact, individuals systematically deviate from
standard notions of rationality.14 This work is sometimes referred to as
behavioral economics, but is more accurately thought of as economics with
an empirical focus. Note that many of these examples cited in this
literature are not merely violations of expected utility in a manner similar
to the Allais paradox or the Ellsberg paradox, which can be rationalized
through the use of complex risk preferences,15 but rather violate notions of
rationality altogether. In the face of such evidence, psychologists such as
Amos Tversky have questioned why economists have such reluctance to
give up the rationality hypothesis in the face of such strong evidence.16
Many economists argue that we can gain some level of confidence for
the view that the realism of the assumptions does not matter from the fact
that often other disciplines such as physics make unrealistic assumptions.17
Indeed, if this is the case, reference to other disciplines might indicate how
these models might be useful in a variety of ways. Other disciplines often
use mathematical forms of optimization even where almost no one is
hypothesizing that some actual choice process is occurring. physicists often
use optimization methods in studying physical systems yet, except for a
very small fringe group, physicists do not assume that the physical systems
at issue are in any real sense part of a decision-making process.18
Economists have long acknowledged that rational models are not the only
ways in which individuals exhibit choice behavior. In essence, many
macroeconomic models actually assume certain levels of irrationality.19
Economists have also argued that the rationality assumption is
reasonable even though it cannot explain all human behavior, because it
13. See Camerer and Lowenstein, supra note
14. For an early example of this work, see K.O. May Intransitivity, Utility and the Aggregation of
Preference Patterns 22 ECONOMETRICA 1 (1954).
15. See description in Terrence Chorvat, Taxing Utility, forthcoming in the Journal of
SOCIOECONOMICS (2005).
16. Amos Tversky, Rational and Constructive Choice in THE RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds, 1996).
17. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at __.
18. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2nd ed., 1983). See
RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, 1 THE FEYNMAN LECTURES ON PHYSICS, 26-3(1970).for a description of the
least time principle.
19. Kenneth Arrow, Rationality of Self and Others_-J. OF BUS.__ (1986).
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can be used to predict much of human behavior. This was form of Alvin
Roth’s response to Amos Tversky’s argument against the rationality
hypothesis. Roth argues that the applicability of rational models depends on
the level of analysis required for the problem.20 Roth divided the levels of
analysis into standard economic models (further subdivided into riskneutral models and expected utility models), psychological models, and
neurobiological models. One could further divide neurobiological models
into those models that address the interactions between larger neural
mechanism ( – for example, certain models address how the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex appears to process data in a manner different than the
insula cortex)21 – versus biochemical models (for example, certain models
address how higher levels of serotonin lead to less impulsive behavior
because of the lower levels of activation in various cortical neural
circuits).22 Research on these two types sis isof a different sort and, while
clearly connected, they yields different types of results. The
raityassumption would seem to be more to the models which involve larger
scale process (e.g., the agent as a whole) than to those models which
address the electrochemical changes is the cells that make up the brain
1.

The Risk Neutral Model

Using Roth’s terminology, the first category of models of economic
behavior are the risk neutral models. Rs of their wealthThis may be viewed
as the very first model for utility theory, as it was designed to explain the
value of various gambles and why individuals are likely to take certain
gambles and not take other gambles. The risk neutral model posited that
individuals act so as to maximize their expected value. This theory was
formulated by Fermat and Pascal in the late 1600’s. Soon after its
formation, problems with the model were discovered.23 The most famous
of these problems is known as the St. Petersburg Paradox, which was
“solved” by Daniel Bernoulli through the creation of an antecedent of
expected utility theory.24
20. Alvin Roth, Adaptive Behaviour and Strategic Rationality: Evidence from the Laboratory and
the Field in THE RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds, 1996)
21. See Alan G. Sanfey et al., The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum
Game, 300 SCI. 1755, 1755-58 (2003).
22. JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE SYNAPTIC SELF (2002) 286-8.
23. See Terrence R. Chorvat, Ambiguity and Income Taxation, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 617, 620-22
(2003).
24. Daniel Bernoulli, Specimen Theoriae Novae de Mensura Sortis, 5 COMMENTARII ACADEMIAE
SCIENTIARUM IMPERIALIS PETROPOLITANAE 175 (1738), translated in Exposition of a New Theory on
the Measurement of Risk, 22 ECONOMETRICA 23 (1952). The St. Petersburg paradox involves a gamble
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Expected Utility Models

As a result of further developments of Bernoulli’s ideas, a new model
of human behavior – the expected utility model – became the standard
model for economic analysis. This second family of models has more
explanatory power regarding behavior than the first, including why
individuals purchase insurance, why stocks have a higher return than
bonds, et cetera.25 Models based on the assumptions of expected utility
theory have also been used to explain the pricing of assets, both real and
financial. These models form the backbone of what can be referred to as
both neoclassical economics and traditional law and economics. These
theories form the basis for game theory, price theory, and the rational
expectations models of macroeconomics.26 Interestingly, while the more
recent expected utility models are able to explain a greater variety of
behavior, there still remain many applications of risk neutral models in
economics. For example, many argue that corporate managers should be
essentially risk-neutral in their decision-making, because shareholders can
diversify away most of the idiosyncratic risk of any corporation.27
Furthermore some economists have argued that the government should
essentially act in risk-neutral manner.28
3.

“Almost Rational” Models

Another type of model which has developed more recently can be
described as “almost rational” models.29 These models resemble expected
utility models in many respects, but add the assumptions that individuals
may have more complicated risk preferences, and may not ignore sunk
costsIn many versions of these models, the reference points of the agents
significantly affect the predicted behavior. One can still call such persons

with an infinite expected value for which individuals are only willing to pay a modest amount. For a
description of the St. Petersburg paradox see Chorvat, supra note 23, at 620-22.
25. Alvin Roth, Adaptive Behaviour and Strategic Rationality: Evidence from the Laboratory and
the Field in THE RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds, 1996)
26. ROBERT E. LUCAS, JR. MODELS OF BUSINESS CYCLES (1987).
27. Alvin Haim Levy and Marshall Sarnat, Diversification, Portfolio Analysis and the Uneasy
Case for Conglomerate Mergers, 27 J. FIN. 795 (1970)Adaptive Behaviour and Strategic Rationality:
Evidence from the Laboratory and the Field in THE RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOUR (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds, 1996)
28. Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment
Decisions, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 364 (1970).
29. Alvin E Roth, Bargaining Experiments, in T OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS349 (John H.
Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995).
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rational although they may have seemingly complicated views of risk.30
These models include a variety of non-expected utility theories.31
4.

Psychological Models

Another family of behavioral models might be described as
psychological models. These models do not posit stable preferences
functions, but rather a set of psychological processes which interact with
the environment to create behavior.32 One could argue that in some sense
that even these models are constitute examples of economic models as
well. The actors in these models are various psychological needs, instead of
individuals of standard economic models, and how the action of the
individual is decided upon depends on the internal dynamic between these
psychological needs. One can analogize these models to economic theories
of group interactions. These models allow for preference reversals, just as
social choice theory shows that group decision making will not always lead
to consistent choices.33 Even these psychological models essentially
assume some rationality principle, in that there is some choice process
behind the various psychological processes and, to the extent that this is
rule based, it too can be rationalized.
5.

Neurobiological Models

The final type of model for human behavior which we should consider
are the neurobiological model. These models are based not on preferences
or psychological processes, but rather on the physical processes of
decision-making. In some sense, these represent the height of rationalizable
models, because physical processes follow deterministic rules until on
arrives at the quantum level.34 There are a variety of these types of models.
Two prominent types of these models are first models which address the
interactions between different brain regions, and second the models which
address the underlying neurochemistry of decisions. Much of the research
in this field is conducted on particular areas of brain activation during
decision-making, as well as research on a more microscopic level.
30. Matthew Rabin & Richard Thaler, Risk Aversion 15 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 219, 221 (2001).
31. For a description of these models see Colin Camerer, Individual Decision-Making in THE
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 626-651 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995).
32. Alvin Roth, Adaptive Behaviour and Strategic Rationality: Evidence from the Laboratory and
the Field in THE RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds, 1996)
33. DAVID KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 174-81(1990)
34. For a discussion of the impact of quantum mechanics of the determinism of the classical
Newtonian physics, see RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, 1 THE FEYNMAN LECTURES ON PHYSICS, 37-11 (1970).
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revealing the changes to neurons and glial cells that occur as the result of
certain events in the brain. Carried to their logical extreme, for example,
these models might reveal that the reason a particular decision was made
was a change in the membrane permeability in certain neuronal and glial
cells.
At the current time, it seems rather far-fetched for economists to
calculate the effects of a 20% versus 25% income tax rate on neuronal
membrane permeability in various regions of the brain. While such models
might eventually attain this level of accuracy, nonetheless, at least
currently, these results would essentially be impractical and would include
too many degrees of freedom to yield helpful predictions.
It is indeed important to understand that level of rationality
appropriate to explain the particular behavior at issue. One of the keys of
science is the creation of falsifiable hypotheses. If a model can always
accommodate all factual evidence, then it is non-falsifiable and therefore
non-scientific.35 Because there are so many differing models for human
behavior, a key problem arises in that one can always ex post choose the
model to best fit the data rather than ex ante predicting what the data
should be. For example, if individuals behave rationally, we might use
rational models; if they don’t, we use psychological or neurobiological
models. Picking and choosing of models ex post in this fashion is
unsatisfactory. We should rather develop a meta model for deciding when
to use rational models, psychological models, or whatever models we
eventually develop. This is particularly true given that, in some sense,
psychological and neurobiological models are more in the nature of
catalogues of decision-processes rather than over-arching models of
decision-making. Future models which incorporate neurobiological
research must be able to predict the behaviors that are more likely to be
better approximated by rational models and those that are more likely to be
better approximated by non-rational models. The models should both
explain the diversity of human behavior and yet predict what will
commonly happen.
II. ECOLOGICAL VERSUS CONSTRUCTIVIST RATIONALITY
Another of the problems with the argument against using rational
models as predictive of human behavior is that it is assumes only one type
of rationality, commonly referred to as constructivist rationality.
35. KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1934).

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

NEUROECONOMICS AND RATIONALITY DRAFT 12

110

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

6/20/2005 3:01 PM

[Vol 80:

Constructivist rationality is based on the rationality utilized by Descartes in
trying to deduce morality and rules of decision-making from a small set of
first principles.36 One can see this type of rationality played out to a great
extent in modern game theory, which assumes a relatively small set of
axioms about the utility of the players and deduces an enormous number of
findings of great complexity.37
But this is not the only form of rationality. It is important to
distinguish constructivist rationality from ecological rationality. Ecological
rationality is not rational in the sense that it concerns a set of decision rules
that are able to predict what should happen in each situation, or that it will
necessarily give the optimal path to the solution that we can see would
have been optimal ex post.38 Rather ecological rationality results in optimal
decision rules given the costs of making the decision and the neurological
mechanisms available to the decision-maker. This is related to constrained
optimization, under which the cost of obtaining new information is
included in the decision constraints. As with bounded rationality, the
decision rules created by ecological rationality may not be rational for all
possible states of the world, but they might be rational in states of the world
that are likely to occur. This view is more likely to reflect neurological
reality than are constructivist notions of rationality.
Not only is individual decision-making more likely of an ecological
nature, but one can argue that governmental decision-making should be of
this variety as well. Just as individuals who are able to learn about their
environment are more likely to survive, institutions which are able to adapt
and change are more likely to survive, and therefore over time are more
likely to comprise a higher proportion of the institutions we see.39 Even
though no one person may understand why an institution has survived, it
will have survived because it was better able to adapt to situations than
other institutions, just as crocodiles do not understand why their kind has
survived since before the time of the dinosaurs.

36. See generally, RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURS DE LA METHODE POUR BIEN CONDUIRE SA
RAISON, & CHERCHER LA VERITÉ DANS LES SCIENCES. PLUS LA DIOPTRIQUE, LES METEORES, LA
MECHANIQUE, ET LA MUSIQUE, QUI SONT DES ESSAIS DE CETTE METHODE (1668)
37. ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (1997).
38. Vernon Smith, Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV.
465 (2003).
39. Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory,58 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1950).
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Game Theory and Constructivist Rationality

Decision theory is the study of how individuals make decisions.40
When these decisions are strategic – that is, where the behavior of each
agent affects decisions made by the others – this study is called game
theory.41 In classical game theory, games are employed as a metaphor for
strategic decision-making by economic actors in situations where choices
by each affect decisions by the others. One can argue that mathematical
decision theory and mathematical game theory give the normatively
“correct” answers to problems. However, in real world situations the
“right” answers might depend on the actual actions of others who may not
be game theorists, and so therefore it is important also to understand the
decisions humans actually make, not just those they “should” make.
Very commonly individuals do not behave as predicted by game
theory.42 This may be for reasons of cognitive limitations, or it may be
because of other reasons which are more difficult to describe but involve
social cognition and group dynamics.
B.

Adaptive Learning

One of the most common tests of rationality is the ability to avoid
what is referred to as a “Dutch book.” A “Dutch book” is a mechanism by
which a series of bargains are placed before a subject, and while each of the
bargains is favorable to the subject yet, at the end of the series, the subject
has no money and nothing to show for it.43 Because we do not observe
many Dutch books in the real world, nor does it seem that rational persons
would permit a Dutch book to operate against them, this has become one of
the standard tests of rationality. It can be demonstrated that, were a robot
endowed with many of the standard utility functions of human beings, they
would be subject to the Dutch book argument.44 Why then don’t we see
Dutch books in the real world?

40. Peter Gärdenfors and Nils-Eric Sahlin, Introduction: Bayesian Decision Theory: Foundations
and Problems in DECISION, PROBABILITY AND UTILITY: SELECTED READING, 3-4 (Peter Gärdenfors and
Nils-Eric Sahlin, eds, 1988)
41. KREPS, supra note _. At 355
42. See generally, COLIN CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY (2003)
43. See Menahem E. Yaari, The Role of Dutch Books in the Theory of Choice in FRONTIERS OF
RESEARCH IN ECONOMIC THEORY: THE NANCY L SCHWARTZ MEMORIAL LECTURES 1983-1997(Donald
Jacobs et al. eds, 1998).
44. Rabin, and Thaler
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Dutch books do not work because people learn not to let others take
advantage of them.45 One can see how learning based models may be both
better predictors of behavior, and in some sense are to be preferred over the
strict expected utility models. For example, it may be optimal for a group
of individuals to allow each member to experiment individually and then
after some period of time the members of the group could begin to imitate
others who have succeeded.46 From an evolutionary perspective, one can
see how agents who adopt the imitation of the success of others as a basic
strategy might succeed in wide variety of environments. This concept is
connected with the notion that we do not need to understand every aspect
of a principle in order to understand how it can be used.47
Therefore, the experiments discussed as disproving rationality might
be better thought of as disproving constructivist rationality.48 With some
introspection, we should not be surprised that individuals who are not
trained as statisticians will make significant mistakes in their decisions.
This does not mean that individual cannot make correct decisions about
questions that involve statistical inference, but rather the method by which
these decisions are made may not reach the normatively correct answer in
all cases.
Both behavioral and neurological research indicates that learning
occurs in very complex frameworks, not merely simple Hebbian
association or “selectionist” models.49 Explanations of human decisionmaking based on evolutionary psychology et cetera are fascinating and
helpful but, ultimately, scientific knowledge and models must flow from
experimental or other empirical evidence, rather than introspection alone.
Focusing on ecological rationality as opposed to constructivist
rationality may cause us to realize that there is no real substitute for the
careful study of natural environments. Were economists to attempt to
understand market behavior without studying real behavior (for example, in
the case of the St. Petersberg paradox50 and insurance), we might not have
been inspired to create the expected utility models in place of the expected
value models. Economic models generally assume tastes are both
45. Rabin and Thaler, supra note x At.
46. Roth, supra note x at.
47. FEYNMAN, supra note 23, at 4-1.
48. For example, the experiments conducted by May, supra note 14, do not necessarily disprove
some type of ecological rationality
49. For a discussion of Hebbian models, See LEDOUX, supra note _ at 80-81.
50. Daniel Bernoulli, Specimen Theoriae Novae de Mensura Sortis, 5 COMENTARII
ACADEMIAE SCIENTIARUM IMPERIALIS PETROPOLINTANAE 175 (1738), translated in
Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk, 22 ECONOMETRICA 23 (1952).
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exogenous and stable.51 We assume that when choices are made which are
different than previous choices, rationality has been violated. It is of course
always possible that preferences have changed. If we were to allow
preference changes to commonly enter into our explanations, we would
almost never be able to falsify a theory, thus removing it from a Popperian
notion of science.52 Without a good theory of how tastes change, we cannot
allow these consideration to enter the models.
Where psychological models and neurobiological models might be
particularly helpful is in enabling us to elucidate how tastes are formed.
This may help to explain paradoxes such as Tversky’s Williams-Sonoma
catalog example (the existence of a third alternative will cause more
purchases of the one of two previous available alternatives, et cetera).53
Research in both psychology and neurology with likely be very helpful in
explaining the effectiveness of advertising, as well as phenomena such as
the degree of trust and trustworthiness of members of different societies.
One reasonable hypothesis about the behavior of subjects in experiments in
different societies is that we are seeing artifacts of their behavior in the
world. This notion is buoyed up by recent research which seems to indicate
that members of different societies often adopt different strategies in simple
experimental situations.54 However, one must consider that one of the
possible effects of the double blind study might be to make clear to the
subjects that the standard rules of society do not apply.
Many researchers in human behavior and biology have adopted an
approach, referred to as cognitive neuroscience, which integrates
psychology, biochemistry, neurology, evolutionary biology and related
sciences in order to further our understanding of human behavior.55 One
problem with such interdisciplinary efforts is coordinating the different
methods of inquiry. Grossly oversimplifying, biological sciences follow
more of a cataloguing approach (e.g., this behavior is correlated with this
neural mechanisms), whereas economics attempts to create models which
predict a wide variety of behavior with very simple models.

51. We say this noting the exception of models such as Becker’(see Gary Becker et al., Rational
Addiction and the Effect of Price on Consumption 81 AM. ECON. REV. 237 (1991) )and derivatives of it.
52. POPPER, supra note 24
53. Amos Tversky, Rational and Constructive Choice in THE RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds, 1996)
54. Joseph Henrich et al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 SmallScale Societies 91 AM. ECON. REV. 73 (2001)
55. MICHAEL GAZZINGA, RICHARD IVRY, & GEORGE MAGNUN, COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE (2nd,
ed. 2002)
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One of the problems with the cataloging method, which has been the
dominant paradigm in the neurological research, is that it fails to predict
new behavior. The opposite problem can be argued applies to economics
with its assumption of rationality. The rationality hypothesis is quite
resilient when there is only a finite amount of data (as long as it complies
with the weak axiom of revealed preference).56 One can analogize some of
the results of economic analysis to the famous experiments in which splitbrain patients were able to rationalize what they did not understand, even
while it was clear that the rationalization was incorrect.57
It has long been hypothesized that biological mechanisms can have
direct control of our behavior in particular areas.58 Merely understanding
that there may be genetic influences on behavior does not tell us how this
behavior is created, nor how the mechanism utilized for one problem may
influence other types of behavior. Cognitive neuroscience can help us to
resolve these questions by directly examining the neural mechanisms
involved. As pointed out by Joseph LeDoux, the link between the brain and
behavior is much, much stronger than the link between genetics and
behavior.59
C.

Ecological Rationality and Neurological Mechanisms

For a variety of reasons, including those discussed above,
constructivist rationality seems unlikely as a paradigm of behavior,
particularly given what we know about neurological mechanisms.
Constructivist rationality seems rather based on forethought about future
states with precise payoffs. Neurological research shows us that there are
many different regions of the brain which process information differently.
This section will discuss some areas of research which explore how this
compartmentalization occurs. In particular, it will examine research which
examines differences between conscious and unconscious process,
differences between personal and impersonal decision and finally some
interesting work on the ultimatum game.
1.

The Cost of Conscious Awareness

Neurological research indicates that cognition is a costly resource.
Because brains are finite, and because there is a payoff to increasing our
56.
57.
58.
59.

MAS COLELL ET AL., supra note_ at 12.
GAZZANIGA, ET AL., SUPRA NOTE_, AT 436-37.
Id. at 62-95.
LEDOUX, supra note 16, at 3-5.
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understanding of the world, the constraints on the capabilities of our brains
can seriously affect the manner in which functions are performed.60 Most
of the brain does not seem to be directly involved in conscious processes.61
Two key questions are, then, how does the brain decide which problems it
will address and, once this selection has been made, what neural
mechanisms are used to solve the problem? It appears that the answers are
governed by rules similar to those which economists and operations
research specialists use in their optimization calculations. In particular, it
appears that the brain consists of modules which solve particular kinds of
problems.62 There are clear evolutionary advantages to this. Individuals are
confronted with a finite, although very large, set of problems. Solving the
specific problems presented and having tissues structured for solving those
problems would be more efficient than having general purpose tissues
which would likely be more costly and not as well adapted.63
Because there are a nearly infinite number of stimuli in the world at
any given time, in order to focus on any object, we must decide to ignore
some stimuli and focus on others. Even after we are aware of a “problem,”
we have many potential mechanisms to use to address the issues raised. For
example, we may react impulsively or we may calculate the optimal
decision. Research in cognitive neuroscience suggests that different
methods of problem solving are located in different parts of the brain. An
example of this can be found in the fact that, patients with damage to the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (PFC) are unlikely to exhibit emotional
responses to stimuli, whereas those patients with dorsolateral PFC damage
appear to have problems in cognitive processing of tasks that do not seem
to evoke emotional processing (for example, the Wisconsin Card Sorting
tasks).64 Interestingly, both types of reasoning seem to be necessary for
optimal problem solving. Because of cognitive limitations, it is not the case
that one should always use either cognitive processing (or more
60. Herbert Simon, Bounded Rationality, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 266-286 (J. Eatwell et al. eds.,
1987).
61. GAZZANIGA, ET AL., SUPRA NOTE_, AT 660-68.
62. J. N. Wood & Jordan Grafman, Human Prefrontal Cortex: Processing and Representational
Perspectives, 4 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 139-147 (2003).
63. P. E. Roland and K. Zilles, Structural Division and Functional Fields in the Human Cerebral
Cortex 26 BRAIN RESEARCH REVIEWS 87-105 (1998).
64. MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, RICHARD IVRY, & GEORGE R. MANGUN, COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND (2nd ed., 2002); The Wisconsin Card Sorting Task
involves sorting cards which have objects on them which vary along three dimensions: shape, color, and
number. The cards are to be sorted according to a method determined by the experimenter, but not
explicitly told to the subjects. The subjects learn the rule by trial an error, via feedback from the
experimenter as to whether a particularly sorting is in accord with the rule or if it violates it.
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colloquially “logic”) or affective processing (more colloquially “emotion”)
which has been conditioned by evolutionary pressures to punish or reward
behavior. Because of these conflicts, and the lack of inherent superiority of
one mechanism over the other, there needs to be some mechanism to
resolve these conflicts. A significant amount of research now focuses on
how this resolution occurs. The goal of this research is to discover how we
maintain cognitive control over our state of mind as well as our actions.65
One region of the brain which is clearly involved in cognitive conflict
resolution is the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). This area is currently
thought to be involved in registering a conflict between regions. Some
researchers argue that after a conflict is recognized, various areas of the
PFC included the ACC also become active and the choice of regions
activated depends on the cognitive requirements of the problem
presented.66 In addition, the context in which the problem is presented may
have a significant impact on the mechanism used to address the problem.67
Some economists have argued that even self-destructive behaviors can
best be modeled as conscious rational choices.68 Others, generally
psychologists, argue that these behaviors are the result of lack of control,
these individuals did not set out to become criminals or addicts, but the
behaviors are the results of cognitive or emotional deficits. Both sides have
significant evidence for their arguments. To the extent these discoveries are
conscious, it is clear that the law can affect them. However, to the extent
that they are unconscious, the ability of law to alter them is less clear.
The extent to which processes are conscious or unconscious may have
a significant effect on legal questions. For example, to what extent should
law attempt to alter unconscious processing in addition to conscious
processes? To what extent can it affect these processes? This is a question
that future research will have to answer.
2.

The Effects of Personal Interaction

There has been a fair amount of research which analyzes the different
brain regions activated by personal as opposed to impersonal interactions.
One example of this is research on the neural mechanisms involved in the
65. James Riling et al., A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation 35 NEURON 395-405 (2002).
66. J.B. Ponchon, R. Levy, P. Rossati, S. Leherily, J.B. Poline, B. Pillon, D. Le Bihan and B. du
Bois, The Neural System that Bridges Reward Cognition in Humans: An fMRI study. 99 PRO. NAT.
ACADEMY SCI. 5669 (2002).
67. J. Metcalfe & W. Mischel, A Hot/Cool-Systems Analysis of Delay of Gratification: Dynamics
of Willpower, 106 PSYCH. REV. 3-19 (1999).
68. Gary Becker et al., Rational Addiction and the Effect of Price on Consumption 81 AM. ECON.
REV. 237 (1991).
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reactions of subjects to standard hypothetical moral dilemmas that involve
personal and impersonal decision-making.69 While using fMRI technology
to image the brains of the subjects, they asked a number of questions,
including a thought experiment regarding how the subjects would respond
if faced with a moral dilemma with the following facts. Subjects are told
that a train is coming down a track and, if they do nothing, the train will hit
a car on the track and five people will be killed but, alternatively, if they
press a button, the train will be diverted to a side track and only one person
will be killed.70 As has been known for many years, most people report that
they would choose to press the button.71 Interestingly, the response is quite
different if a similar, but slightly different, situation is presented. In this
second moral dilemma, the subjects would have to push the person next to
them onto the track, killing them.72 Here, most people answer they would
not do that. The study shows that the parts of the brain that are actively
involved in the decision to push the person are similar to those involved in
fear and grief.73 The decision to flip the switch, which would also result in
killing a human, involved far fewer emotional reactions. In particular, the
areas more likely to be active in personal moral dilemmas – such as
pushing the person on to the tracks – were areas of the medial frontal gyrus,
the posterior cingulate gyrus, and the bilateral superior temporal sulcus
(STS). These areas are normally involved in social-emotional processing.74
The non-moral or impersonal dilemmas (e.g., switching the train track)
tend to activate areas in the dorsolateral PFC and the parietal cortex
(normally involved in calculation) and executive function.76 For those
subjects who did decide to push the person next to them, one might argue
that “logic” or cognitive processes prevailed over “emotion”. Interestingly,
those who did decide to push the other person took significantly longer in
making this decision than those who chose not to push the other person (a
difference of 5 seconds for those who would not push the person versus
6.75 for those who would). There was very little difference between the
69. See Joshua Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment,
293 SCI. 2105 (2001).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Joshua Greene and Jonathon Haidt, How and Where Does Moral Judgment Work, 6 TRENDS
IN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 517 (2002).
76. Stanislas Dehaene, The Organization of Brain Activations in Number Comparison, 8. J. COG.
NEUROSCIENCE 47 (1996).
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brain activation or decision time between impersonal moral dilemmas and
non-moral dilemmas (less than ½ of second). This would tend to indicate
that the more impersonal the decision becomes, the more we can be
“rational” or rather adopt what one might argue are socially optimal
decision making mechanisms. This suggests that certain types of moral
decision making involves a fair amount of social thinking and invokes
notions of positive and negative reciprocity, and personalization. Other
more recent experiments confirm that the regions of the brain involved in
moral processing are also the same regions used in social cognition.77 One
recent study by Moll et al. attempted to separate out the regions involved in
moral judgments as opposed to those involved in emotional processing.
They found that moral situations differentially activated the STS and the
OFC.78 One key distinction between this experiment and the Greene
experiment is that the subjects were merely reacting to stimuli rather than
making decisions about how to behave.
Consistent with these experiments as well as many others, it appears
that the method of reasoning changes depending on the nature of the
problem presented. This may have many applications for our understanding
of law and the legal system. For example, in attempting to understand how
juries reach the decisions they do, we can see that individuals may make
socially-optimal choices more when they keep the subject of the decision at
a distance. If the decision is personalized in some way, this can in and of
itself alter the decision. Of course, more work needs to be done to fully
understand what kinds of situations result in personalization and the precise
way in which reasoning processes differ between personal and impersonal
situations. To the extent that the conclusions from these experiments bear
up in further experiments, society may have an interest in depersonalizing
problems that are presented to decision-makers. In addition, objectivity
may require more than simply not being related or having a direct stake in
the outcome. These and other experiments suggest that even having to face
someone is enough to invoke personal and social triggers.80 This research
may also indicate that society needs to frame interactions so that the
“personalization” will result in actions that are in accord with what is
77. Jorge Moll et al., The Neural Correlates of Moral Sensitivity: A Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging Investigation of Basic and Moral Emotions 22 J. OF NEUROSCIENCE 2730 (2002).
78. Jorge Moll et al., Functional Networks in Emotional Moral and Nonmoral Social Judgments
16 NEUROIMAGE 696 (2002).
80. John Ledyard, Public Goods in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS (John Kagel
and Alvin Roth eds., 1995).
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socially optimal, rather than being in conflict with it (e.g., attempt to utilize
personalization to obtain optimal cooperation). One hopes that further
research in this area will examine how individuals personalize problems
when the stakes to personalization are high.
It appears that moral reasoning is spread across many neural
mechanisms81 and how any particular problem is resolved appears to
depend on the interaction of these mechanisms. It appears that any moral
problem may be approached in a very different manner than another that
may appear to be similar to our conscious minds. Therefore, an important
line of future research is the attempt to understand the mechanisms by
which problems are interpreted. In particular, how problems become
perceived as social and how at other times problems can be interpreted as
“simply” cognitive problems is one of the key questions for understanding
the impact of law on behavior.
3.

The Ultimatum Game

Many of the mechanisms used by the brain to deal with situations of
cognitive conflict are illustrated in the ultimatum game. The neurological
studies of how players in this game make decisions illustrate the
mechanisms the brain uses to resolve the conflict between deciding
whether to accept money (something generally desired) but, at the same
time, also accepting what individuals are likely to view as an unfair
bargain, or choosing to reject the money and enforce fairness. Similar
mechanisms appear to be invoked whenever actions against the subject’s
immediate self-interest are chosen.
The ultimatum game is a two-player game in which the first player is
given a stake and is told to divide it between the two players. After the first
player has decided, the second player can then choose to accept the
division, or to reject the division. If the second player rejects the division,
both player get nothing. It is fairly common for the proposed division to be
a 50/50 split. However, many time the first player will propose an unfair
split (e.g., a 90/10 split). These latter splits are commonly rejected by the
second player.82
One experiment on the neural mechanisms involve in the decision of
the second players found that those players who rejected “unfair” offers
81. William Casebeer & Patricia Churchland, The Neural Mechanisms of Moral Cognition: A
mulitple- Aspect Approach to Moral Judgment and Decision-Making 18 BIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY
169-194 (2003).
82. See CAMERER, supra note 42 at 8-12.
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had much higher activation in the insula cortex, than those who accepted
these offers. On the other hand, those who accepted these offers had higher
activations in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. In both types of subjects
the ACC was also significantly active.83
As the Sanfey et al. experiment shows, different brain regions (such as
the insula and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) seem to embody different
thought processes.84 To some extent the ACC seems to moderate between
these different regions depending on the situation. The neurological
mechanism would appear to be more consistent with an ecological
approach to be more consistent with an ecological approach to rationality.
That is, individuals have a variety of mechanisms which adopt different
approaches to problems. These approaches are then mediated by neural
mechanisms, which are likely based on reward signaling. Therefore it
should not come as surprise that individuals adopt seemingly “irrational”
strategies to problems.
4.

Ecological Rationality and Economics

Neurological research seems to indicate that the brain has different
decision-making mechanisms which often lead to different decisions. This
would not seem to be in accord with constructivist notions of rationality,
which imply only one type of decision-making mechanism. Far from being
problematic, this actually allows for a more ecological approach to
decision-making, where different approaches are considered before the best
solution is selected. This kind of decision-making works best when not
every decision concerns life or death, but rather merely increases or
decreases the likelihood of survival in some understandable way. If it is not
possible to guess ahead of time what mode will necessarily yield the
correct decision, it may be more productive to be able to generate a variety
of different strategies and later determine which might work best.
In addition, ecological rationality is not necessarily antithetical to
many of the prediction of traditional economics. A large portion of
standard economic results are of type referred to as comparative static
results, i.e. what will occur at equilibrium. Ecological rationality models
indicate that the comparative statics of boundedly rational actors will often
result in efficient outcomes, in fact possibly more efficient than standard
economic theory predicts. It might very well be the case that these models
83. See generally Alan G. Sanfey et al., The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the
Ultimatum Game, 300 SCI. 1755, 1755-57 (2003) (explaining the neural mechanisms involved with
regard to inequality aversion).
84. Id.
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depart from the predictions of constructivist rationality more in the
dynamics of how the predicted equilibria arise, rather than in the
characteristics of these equilbria.
When problems are particularly hard for individuals to solve, we often
create institutions to deal with these problems. Consider for example the
institutional forms of corporations or governments. These do not really
exist as physical entities but are merely mechanisms which we have
adopted in order to more easily account for certain actions given our
cognitive mechanisms. These are examples of institutions that were
developed by a relatively small number of individuals, but have now been
adopted world-wide.
CONCLUSION
Current empirical research on decision-making indicates that there are
important ways in which individuals do not conform to standard economic
models. However, it would be a mistake to conclude from this that
individuals should be labeled irrational. In fact, the research indicates that
individuals who are behaving irrationally under constructivist notions of
rationality are often behaving consistently with ecological notions of
rationality. However, much more work needs to be done to understand the
precise nature of human decision-making. This research need to consider
context, both environmental and neurological, in which these decision are
made.
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